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NOTES, COMMENTS and DIGESTS
CORPORATE CONTROL BY OTHER COMMON CARRIERS
UNDER THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT*
Of the many problems of economic regulation that have arisen from the
Civil Aeronautics Act,1 those under Section 408 are among the most numerous
and perplexing.2 The first occasion on which the courts have been faced with
this section arose when Pan American Airways Company petitioned the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of two decisions of the
Civil Aeronautics Board.$ American Export Airlines, Incorporated, had applied
to the Board for certificates of public convenience and necessity under Section
401 and had accompanied this with an application for approval of acquisition
of control by American Export Lines, Incorporated, 4 under Section 408. The
Board dismissed the application for approval on the ground that approval was
not necessary since the control had been acquired before the applicant became
an aii carrier, i.e. before it received the certificate of convenience and necessity.5 In fact the steamship company had organized American Export Airlines
even before the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed.6
Pan American, which was an intervener in the proceedings, contended that
the Board erred in granting the certificates without first approving of the
"acquisition of control," and that such approval was required by Sections
408(a) (5) and 408(b).7 The reasoning of the Board and of Export was that
in creating the subsidiary the steamship company had acquired control of a
corporation which was not an air carrier, and that when the subsidiary became
* Pan American Airways Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al. 121 F. 2d 810

(C. C. A. 2nd 1941).
1. 52 Stat. 973 (1938), 49 USCA §401 (Supp. 1940).
2. Melone, Controlled Competition: Three Years of the Civil Aeronautics Act
(1941) 12 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 318.
3. Pan American Airways Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al. 121 F. 2d 810
(C. C. A. 2nd 1941).

4.

American Export Lines, Inc. is a steamship line operating in the North

Atlantic.
5. In the Matter of the Application of American Export Airlines, Inc., Docket
No. 238; Board Order, Serial No. 581, July 12, 1940.
6. Export was organized In 1937, -whereas the Civil Aeronautics Act became
effective June 23, 1938.
7. 52 Stat. 1001 (1938), 49 USCA §488 (Supp. 1940). "Sec. 408(a) It shall
be unlawful, unless approved by order of the Authority as provided in this section. . . (5) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any other common
carrier, or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to acquire control
of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever; . . "
"See. 408(b) . . . 'Unless, after such hearing, the Authority finds that the

consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control

will not be consistent with the public interest or that the conditions of this section
will not be fulfilled, it shall by order, approve such consolidation, merger, purchase,
lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control upon such terms and conditions as

it shall find to be Just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may prescribe. . . . Provided further, that if the applicant is a carrier other than an air
carrier or a person controlled by a carrier other than an air carrier or affiliated therewith within the meaning of Section 5 (8) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended,
such applicant shall for the purposes of this section be considered an air carrier and
the Authority shall not enter such an order of approval unless it finds that the
transaction proposed will promote the public interest by enabling such carrier other
than an air carrier to use aircraft to public advantage in its operations and will not
restrain competition."
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an air carrier, the steamship company already had control, hence there was no
"acquisition" ufnder the Act. They contended that Section 408(a) (5) forbade
the unapproved acquisition of a certain type of corporation, viz., an air carrier,
and that the steamship company never performed such an act of acquisition.
Therefore, it follows that if absence of approval here is not unlawful under
Section 408(a) (5), then approval is not required under the second proviso of
Section 408(b).
Thus the court faced two problems in this respect: 1. Is approval of
acquisition under Section 408 a condition precedent to the granting of a certificate under Section 401 ?s 2. Do Sections 408(a) (5) and 408(b) apply to
the case where a common carrier creates a subsidiary for the purpose of later
becoming an air carrier?
In approaching the first of these problems the court gleaned no assistance
from the terms of the Act itself. The complete absence of any statutory mandate or previous cases on this point left the court free to use its own discretion.
The basis of the court's ruling that the certificates were properly granted without approval of acquisition must rest on other considerations.
No precedents in the aviation field lay before the court to help it in its
determination. However, similar situations have arisen under the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935. 9 Section 213(a) of that Act, which is comparable to
Section 408 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, provides that it is lawful for a
carrier other than a motor carrier to acquire control of a motor carrier only
-on condition that the Interstate Commerce Commission finds that the public
interest would be promoted because the applicant was able to use motor service
to the public advantage in its own operations. 10 An order of approval from
the commission must be obtained. Of course, the decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission which have come down under this section were not
binding upon the Civil Aeronautics Board or upon the court, but the conditions
are so nearly parallel in some respects that they were very properly used as
guides. The leading case under Section 213 was Pennsylvania Truck Lines,
Inc.-Control-Barker.II There approval of acquisition was at first denied on
the ground that there would be competition with other railroads and truck
lines; but on rehearing approval was granted to the extent that the service
would be' auxiliary and supplementary to the operations of the railroad. While
the "auxiliary and supplementary" rule as set forth in this case and those
under Section 213 that follow it, goes to the merits of the case, an issue with
which the court' here was not concerned, it is significant to note that the rule
has also come up in cases involving an application for a certificate. In none
of these cases was the certificate denied merely because the proposed operations were not auxiliary and supplementary to the operations of the parent. It
is true, however, that in some instances the certificates were limited to the
extent to which such operations were auxiliary and supplementary.' 2 Herein
8. 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1940). Section 401 requires all
for the conditions and procedure for the granting thereof.
9. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 USCA §301 (Supp. 1940).
air carriers to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity and provides
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 555, 49 USCA §313 (Supp. 1940).
1 M. C. C. 101 (1936), 5 M. C. C. 9 and 49 (1937).
Kansas City Southern Transport Co., Inc., Common Carrier Application,

10 M. C. C. 221 (1938) ; Texas and Pacific Motor Transport Co. Common Carrier

Application, 10 M. C. C. 525 (1938).

NOTES,, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
the Commission seems to have been inconsistent because in other cases it held
that the rule of the Barker case under Section 213 was not germane in a proceeding on application for a certificate.'s It was these latter cases which the
court in the principal case chose to follow in holding that the Board properly
granted the certificate to Export even though it should have considered the
14
merits of the application for approval of acquisition.
An analysis of these two conflicting types of cases will provide some justification for the court's choice. In those cases in which the granting of the
certificate was limited by the "auxiliary and supplementary" rule any further
operations would have caused wasteful competition and placed the applicant
in an unfairly favorable competitive position. In the case at hand it was
apparent to the court that the Board actually wanted to create domestic competition in the field of foreign air transportation," and refused to adopt the
principle of the Barker case. Therefore, in choosing between these two lines
of cases, the court selected that which would better effectuate the apparent
policy of the Board to limit Pan American's monopoly.
In the light of the Court's decision in respect to the second problemnamely, that approval of the steamship company's control over Export must
be obtained from the Board-it does not seem inadvisable that the certificates
were allowed to remain as granted. The authority of the Board under Section
408(e) to regulate completely any situation which it finds violates any of the
provisions of Section 408 removes any necessity for further regulation by
withholding a certificate. Thus the court in following the course which it did
in respect to this problem, accepted the rulings under the Motor Carrier Act
insofar as they gave effect to the Board's desire to create competition in overseas air transportation and at the same time did not weaken the Board's powers
of economic regulation.
Under the second problem the court was required to meet the argument
of the respondents (export) that Section 408(a) (5) did not apply to the case
where a corporation became an air -carrier at a time when it already was
controlled by an outside carrier. The court regarded this as an "unduly
literal interpretation" 6 of the section and held that the Board should not
have dismissed the application for approval. This seems to be" the more
reasonable analysis of the words used, because the Board's position presented
an anomalous situation in which the steamship company at one time did not
control an air carrier and at a later time did control an air carrier, but at no
time in the interim did it "acquire control" of an air carrier.1 T The court
said that "to acquire control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever"
meant "to take all steps involved in obtaining control,"'18 and one of the steps
13. Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 21 M. C. C. 725
(1940) : St. Andrews Bay Transport Bay Co. Extension of Operations 3 M. C. C.
711 (1937).
14. An interesting problem in connection with the merits of the application for
approval Is the possibility of a distinction if the steamship company bad applied
directly and not through a subsidiary. Of. Illinois Central Railroad Co. Common
Carrier Application, 12 M. C. C. 485 (1939).
15. 2 C. A. B. 16, 29 (1940).
16. Pan American Airways Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Board et a]. 121 F. 2d 810,
815 (C. A. A. 2nd 1941).
17. Cf. The dissenting opinion of Board Member Ryan, 2 C. A. B. 16, 51 (1940).
18. 'Pan American Airways Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al. 121 F. 2d 810,
815 (C. C. A. 2nd 1941).
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involved in obtaining control in this case was the obtaining of a certificate to
operate. Thus the "acquisition" was not complete until the certificate was
granted and the granting of the certificate consummated an act for which
approval of acquisition was necessary.
In the matter of precedent the court did not find as much help as in the
other problem. The motor cases under Section 213 were not useful in deciding
whether approval of acquisition was necessary because none of them was
analogous to Export's situation. It is improbable that such a problem would'
arise under the Motor Carrier Act for two reasons. First, motor line territories are more fully exploited than air lines, so that an outside carrier would
be more likely to take over an existing motor service than to try to create a
new one in competition with those already there. Second, the definition of
a motor carrier postulates existing operations, 19 whereas to constitute an air
20
carrier there must be merely an undertaking.
A common method of solving problems of statutory construction is to
inquire into the intention of the legislature. The failure of the court to
consider this even though counsel raised the issue indicates that the evidence
of intention was not sufficiently conclusive. Yet its significance is not entirely
ephemeral. The history of federal legislative activity in the field of transportation manifests a .desire on the part of Congress. for direct economic
regulation. The Panama Canal Act of 1912, whiich in effect amends the
Interstate Commerce Act, forbids railroads or other carriers from having
any interlocking relationships with any water carrier operating through the
Panama Canal or elsewhere if the railroad competes with it for traffic. 2 1
Also, as has been pointed out, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 legalized such
relationships between motor and other carriers only after a finding that the
other carrier could use such services to the public advantage in its own
operations and approval of the whole transaction by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Just as in the Civil Aeronautics Act, the language used is
susceptible to an interpretation such as the Board made here. However, it
appears to have been the desire of Congress to prevent the railroads from
gaining such a degree of control over the motor carrier industry that they
might stifle the competition it offers. 22 If some method were left so that
they could, the intention of Congress would be thwarted. It seems apparent
that Congress did not intend to have such an interpretation placed upon the
Motor Carrier Act. The same applies to the Civil Aeronautics Act. The
49 USCA §303 (Supp. 1940).

19.

49 Stat. 544 (1935),

21.

37 Stat. 566 (1912), 49 USCA §5(10) (1929).

Sections 203(a) (14)

and (16) define "common carrier by motor vehicle" and "motor carrier." These
definitions were explained in Crichton-Purchase-C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 35 M. C. C.
661, 663 (1940).
1
20. 52 Stat. 977 (1938), 49 USCA §401 (Supp. 1940). "See. 1(2). 'Air
carrier' means any citizen of the United States who undertakes, whether directly or
indirectly or by a lease or any other arrangement, to engage in air transportation
" The Interstate Commerce Commission would not consider an application under
§213 unless the vendor carrier was already operating. Crichton-Purchaser-C. Lewis
Lavine, Inc., 35 M. C. C. 661 (1940).
Mr. Sadowski, speaking in the House of Representatives on Section 213,
said, ". .. (I)t is the intent, and It is important to the welfare and progress of the
motor carrier industry, that the acquisition of control of the carriers be regulated
by the Commission, so that the control does not get into the hands of other competing forms of transportation, who might use the control as a means to strangle,
curtail, or hinder progress in highway transportation for the benefit of the other
competing transportation." 79 Cong. Rec., July 31, 1935, at 12206.
22.
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language repeatedly used in explaining Section 408 in both Houses was: "this
section prohibits consolidations, mergers, or interlocking relationships between
air carriers and between air carriers and certain other'types of companies
2
The term "interlocking relationships"
unless 'approved by the Authority."
is a broad one and indicates an intention on the part of Congress to include
all possible situations. There is good reason for concluding, therefore, that
the decision of the court effectuated the Congressional policy.
As involved in this problem the question of public policy is important.
Is the court's decision the most desirable one or would it have been better to
have retained the Board's position? In his dissenting opinion, Board member
Ryan pointed out that policy reasons apply identically to both situations
24
because the result is the same-a common carrier controls an air carrier.
This is not entirely accurate, however. The principal arguments of policy
in defense of the Board's position indicate a difference between the situations
where an existing air carrier is acquired by a common carrier and where a
subsidiary becomes an air carrier. To allow an existing air carrier to be
acquired without approval would be to permit the parent company to become,
in effect, an air carrier without any regulation of the change. This is not
so where a certificate has to be obtained. However, the likelihood of successful
regulation of acquisitions in certificate cases is subject to doubt. There are
only two standards in Section 401(d) (1) for the discretion of the Board in'
25
One is whether
making the otherwise mandatory grant of the certificate.
the applicant is ready, willing, and able to perform and to conform to the
regulations; the other is whether the transportation is required by the public
convenience and necessity. Regulation of interlocking relationships through
this section is based upon the explication of public convenience and necessity
26
Therein it is declared that
as set forth in the policy section of the act.
public convenience and necessity require the fostering of sound economic
conditions in the industry. Of. course, in accordance with this' the Board
could place conditions in the certificate as it is authorized to do by 'Section
401(f); but its power to control consolidations in this manner would be
limited. A carrier, by refusing to fulfill the conditions, could refrain from
giving a necessary service and could place itself in a position to bargain with
the Board. It is undesirable to allow any of the Board's decisions to be made
under influences of this kind. The answer which Pan American made to this
first argument of the Board was that under the Board's interpretation of
Section 408(a) (5) a subsidiary could be acquired after its certificate was
granted but before it had begun to operate and thereby avoid any regulation.
The soundness of this depends upon the meaning of the words "undertakes
to engage in air transportation." It is improbable that anything more than the
possession of a certificate is required to create such an undertaking.27
The other argument which the Board made was little different from the
one already stated and may be answered in the same way; namely, that because
of the public interest in the industry, a company should not be allowed to
vitiate the economic regulation exercised by means of conditions in the
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

83 Cong. Ree., June 11, 1938, at 8863 (§410).
2 C. A. B. 16, 5D (1940).
52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 USCA §481 (Supp. 1940).
Id. at 980, 49 USCA §402 (Supp. 1940).
See note 20 supra.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
certificate by failing to perform those conditions and thereby gaining bargaining power over the Board. This second argument is that where an existing air carrier is acquired, the basis for authorization of the original certificate has changed. Like the first argument it indicates merely that it is more
important to bring.the normal case under Sections 408(a)(5) and 408(b),
than this case. It does not show that as a matter of policy these sections should
not govern the instant case.
The conclusion to be reached, then, is that there are no policy reasons
capable of invalidating the remand which the court ordered for the purpose of
approving the acquisition. Whatever strength there may be in the argumeni
that direct and unencumbered supervision of such interlocking relationships is
the preferable course of action, concurs with the old proverb that it is better
to be safe than sorry.2 8 This justifiable decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals as to the all-inclusiveness of Section 408(a) (5) raises a warning
finger to any future contention that it does not apply to some other interlocking or control situation.
GRANT F. WATSON
JEROME SILBERG

28. It was suggested that if the Board's interpretation of §408(a) (5) were
applied to the similar language of §408(a) (6), then an air carrier could create by
the same method an airplane manufacturing company from which it could buy, equipment cheaper. The fallacy of this argument is that a manufacturing company does
not require a certificate, but becomes a manufacturing company at the moment of
incorporation.

Revocation of Pilot's Certificate.-Appeal.-Motion for Stay of Order
of Civil Aeronautics Board.-On February 28, 1941, the Civil Aeronautics
Board issued its order serial number 914, In the Matter of Raymond Lee Kidd,
Holder of Private Pilot Certificate No. 48357, revoking said pilot certificate.
On March 26, 1941, Mr. Kidd filed a petition for review with the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in which he asked for a review
of the Board's order and for a stay of the order pending consideration of the
petition on the merits. This matter was set for argument by the Court on
April 2. The Civil Aeronautics Board filed its "Points and Authorities * * *
in Opposition to Prayers for Stay" in which it was argued that the Petitioner
had made no showing that the Board had erred in any respect in entering the
order complained of and that the Petitioner had not shown that he would be
irreparably injured by denial of the stay. At the hearing, in his argument and
opposition to the stay Counsel for the Board offered to argue the case on the
merits at any time in order that Petitioner might have a review on the merits
as speedily as possible. The Court stated that it would not take the responsibility, without a hearing on the merits, of authorizing a pilot to fly when the
Board had concluded, after a hearing, that it was not safe to permit that pilot
to continue flying. Accordingly, theCourt denied the stay from the bench and
set the case down for hearing on the merits on April 21, 1941, and ordered both
parties to file briefs on or before that date. On April 18, 1941, Counsel for
Petitioner requested a continuance. This was granted by the Court and the
case passed to the November term. Subsequently, the case was set for hearing
on the merits on December 9;1941. On or about November 12, 1941, Petitioner
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filed a motion to dismiss his appeal and on that day the Court entered its order
of dismissal.
In a similar case a stay was recently refused by the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
On September 24, 1941, the Civil Aeronautics Board entered its order
serial number 1265 suspending for a period of sixty days the commercial pilot
certificate No. 1199 held by Hugh C. Robbins. On October 2,1941, Mr. Robbins
filed a petition for review of the order of the Board and a motion for a stay
of the Board's order in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. The "Points and Authorities of the Civil Aeronautics Board
in Opposition to Motion for Stay" were filed with the Court. The hearing on
the motion to stay was returnable on October 6th. At the hearing Counsel for
the Board opposed the motion and offered to argue and submit the case on the
merits immediately. The Court refused this offer. However, during Petitioner's argument all of the questions asked by the Court went to the merits.
The Court inferred that no stay would be granted unless it was clearly indicated
and shown by Counsel for Petitioner that there was merit in Mr. Robbins'
petition for review. At the close of the argument the Court borrowed from
Counsel copies of the transcript (of the hearing held by the Board). On October 8, 1941, the Court denied Petitioner's motion for a stay and on October 16,
Petitioner filed a stipulation to dismiss.

Workmen's Compensation.-Status of Reserve Pilot Under Statute
Determined by Yearly Earnings Whether Acting as First Pilot or Co-Pilot
at Time of Accident.-Russel C. Mossman was an employee of the Chicago
& Southern Airlines and was killed on August 5, 1936, when an airplane
operated by said company crashed in St. Louis County, Missouri. A claim
was brought by his widow, Melba May Mossman, against the employer
before the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission. The Referee
before whom the case was heard found in favor of the employer, after
which the claimant appealed to the full Commission. The Commission
affirmed the decision of the Referee, with one of the Commissioners dissenting. Claimant then appealed to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County,
which again affirmed the award of the Commission. An appeal was then
taken to the St. Louis Court of Appeals and the final decision of the.Missouri Courts was rendered affirming the decision in favor of the employer.
Mossman had for some time been a first pilot, but on June 1, 193b, his
status was changed to that of reserve pilot. As reserve pilot he would
sometimes sit in the first pilot's seat and sometimes in the co-pilot's seat.
When acting as first pilot he earned a first pilot salary computed on a rate
of base pay plus flying time and when acting as co-pilot he received a copilot straight salary of $225.00 per month. At the time of his death he was
acting as co-pilot in the plane.
The claimant contended that inasmuch as he was acting as co-pilot at
the time of his death his status was that of a co-pilot and his pay was
$225.00 per month. Under this theory the employee would be covered by

94

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

the Missouri Workmen's Compensation which covers such employees who
earn less than $3600.00 per year. The employer contended that Mossman
could not be considered to be a co-pilot merely because he was sitting in the
co-pilot seat at the time of the accident but that he still must be considered
to be a reserve pilot and his status must be based upon income earned by
him as a reserve pilot. The evidence disclosed that during the period he had
served as reserve pilot his earnings would have averaged $3753.00 for the
full year period.
The Court of Appeals held that Mossman must be considered to be a
reserve pilot whether he was acting as first pilot or co-pilot at the time of
his death; that the Court would not adopt a construction which would compel it to rule that his status would change from day to day depending upon
the specific task of that particular day. At all times he was held to be a
reserve pilot. Therefore, inasmuch as his earnings exceeded the $3600.00
limitation of the Compensation Act, the Court declared that he was not under
the Act and the decision slould be in favor of the employer.
Claimant filed a Motion for Rehearing which was denied by the Appellate Court on September 12, 1941. Mossman v. Chicago & Southern Airlines,
153 S. W. (2d) 799 (1941).

